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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

APR 74

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences

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3 APRIL 1974
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW AFFIRMS KISSINGER ACCOMPLISHMENTS, POINTS TO SUMMIT

Moscow has marshaled its forces to reject assertions in the West that Secretary of State Kissinger's 24-28 March visit to Moscow failed to achieve its objectives.

On the eve of the visit, Moscow made clear its feeling that the U.S.-Soviet consultations should provide a new impetus to the process of improving relations and thereby counter increasing pessimism about detente in the West. And since the visit it has painstakingly shown that it did just that, despite the absence of specific results to announce. Moscow radio observer Valentin Zorin summed up this view in the 31 March international observers' roundtable, saying the visit "showed the groundlessness of allegations that the process of further improving Soviet-U.S. relations has no future." In a widely broadcast 29 March commentary, Vladimir Volgin argued that the visit invalidated pessimistic forecasts in the U.S. press about the prospects for SALT and economic cooperation in particular. An assessment by IZVESTIYA observer Aleksandr Bovin on 30 March in effect acknowledged that the Moscow consultations had pointed up some difficult issues: he conceded that further agreements, particularly in SALT, will not come easily. But Bovin argued that such difficulties only illustrate the need "not to slow down, but to intensify the persistent and patient work" aimed at overcoming them.

Since the visit Moscow has clearly implied that it still looks to the new summit itself to provide the kind of specific results needed to calm critics at home as well as abroad. In the 31 March roundtable discussion, Zorin acknowledged that "the thing now is for both sides to take specific steps in the direction already outlined." Taking a cue from a similar prediction by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the 27 March luncheon in Moscow given by Secretary Kissinger, Bovin expressed confidence in his IZVESTIYA article that it is precisely the forthcoming summit that will yield "the major new steps" that are now called for.

Moscow went out of its way during the visit to express confidence that both governments intend to continue strong support for improving relations, while suggesting that the difficulties now arising result from opponents of Administration policy within the United States. In the words of the TASS report of the 27 March luncheon, "Andrey Gromyko

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welcomed the determination of the U.S. Government, reaffirmed by the U.S. Secretary of State, to continue support for the cause of improving and intensifying Soviet-U.S. relations." Nevertheless, concern about the U.S. position at SALT was clearly reflected in Bovin's analysis. He quoted one Western newspaper on the "sharp differences in view over the American position" and went on to acknowledge that those "observers are right who note the distinct influence of the military-industrial complex on the position of the American side."

MOSCOW RAPS WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE PLANS, NATO ANNIVERSARY

Against the background of public recriminations between the United States and the EC in recent weeks, Moscow has reminded West Europe that the USSR remains firmly opposed to proposals for increased defense cooperation among West European countries. Moscow restated its long-standing opposition to such proposals in an authoritative article in IZVESTIYA on 28 March and also reiterated some of the same themes, as well as more general criticism of Western defense policies, in comment pegged to NATO's 25th anniversary on 4 April. The IZVESTIYA article by D. Proektor, a specialist on European affairs with the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, is the most extensive treatment of West European defense cooperation to appear in the Soviet central press since a PRAVDA article by political commentator Yuriy Zhukov on 25 December 1973.*

ANTI-DETENTE FORCES As in past Soviet comment on the issue, Proektor's main theme is that European defense represents an effort to block detente. Asserting that pre-conditions "now exist" for establishing a system of collective security in Europe, Proektor scores "opponents of European detente" who seek to postpone and prevent creation of such a system. He singles out in this regard advocates of "the plan for so-called West European military integration." As is typical in Soviet media treatment of this issue, Proektor makes little attempt to deal with specific European proposals or with the issues that have emerged in the European dialogue. He concentrates instead on disparaging the alleged motives behind such proposals and on warning of the undesirable consequences of their implementation. Thus, projects

* For a review of the Zhukov article, see the TRENDS for 9 January 1974, pp. 4-5.

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for military cooperation in West Europe are said to be stimulated in part by arms monopolies for profit motives and promoted by certain "reactionary circles" for anti-Soviet and antisocialist military purposes. Other advocates are said to include those who fear the influence of socialist ideas and seek a way to shore up capital and monopoly interests at a time when "the general crisis of capitalism" is deepening.

Somewhat inconsistently, but also in line with past Soviet comment, Proektor charges that West European proposals for defense cooperation are also intended to resolve "contradictions" and divergent national interests between the United States and the EC. Citing the areas of world trade, currency matters, and energy and defense policies as examples of differences, Proektor comments:

It is not for nothing that part of the West European press explains the present plans for military integration as the desire of the EC countries to raise their status and exert political pressure on the United States on a broad range of existing contradictions.

Proektor stresses, however, that "irrespective of the avowed intention," West European plans for increased defense cooperation would be disadvantageous and dangerous for West Europe, because military ties with the NATO system would be strengthened rather than dissolved, due to requirements for a unified military strategy, and because such plans "lead not to peace but to hostility [and] confrontation" between NATO and the socialist countries. To reinforce the point, Proektor alludes to the possibility that West Germany could acquire nuclear weapons under proposed new defense arrangements.

NATO ANNIVERSARY In recent comment on NATO's 25th anniversary, Moscow has also pressed the theme of a military danger to Europe inherent in the confrontation of rival military blocs. IZVESTIYA observer M. Mikhaylov, for instance, in the weekly observers roundtable broadcast over Moscow radio on 31 March, used the well-worn accusation that the establishment of NATO had caused the postwar division of Europe and the "dangerous military confrontation" there. TASS on 29 March, reviewing a RED STAR article on NATO titled "Jubilee Without Drums," cited several passages condemning NATO for having caused various world crises and for having sparked an arms race in Europe.

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In general, recent Soviet comment on NATO has stressed the line that NATO is an anachronistic organization, "fruit and remnant of the cold war," having nothing in common with the principles of peaceful coexistence and European security. Moscow has sought to depict NATO as an organization deprived by detente of its rationale for existing and increasingly deprived of public support. Although some comment has noted that NATO documents have expressed approval of various aspects of European detente--including such events as the ongoing CSCE and MBFR talks, treaties between the USSR and Poland and West Germany, and the Four-Power Agreement on West Berlin--Moscow has characterized NATO's approval as acceptance "in words" only, more than counterbalanced by continued pursuit of its previous cold war policies. Several commentators have also sought to portray NATO as racked by conflicts between the United States and its West European allies, noting in addition that the recent rift in U.S.-EC relations had greatly dampened NATO's original plans to mark its anniversary.

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BELGRADE-ROME DISPUTE

YUGOSLAV COMMENTATOR DEPLORES LACK OF SOVIET BLOC SUPPORT

While Belgrade media have sustained a broad campaign of defiant comment against Italy's "irredentist" position regarding Yugoslav administration of the Zone B region south of Trieste, a late March talk by prominent Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic juxtaposed such anti-Italian thrusts with criticism of Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies for failure to support the Yugoslav side of the border quarrel. Sundic also pointedly noted that Moscow had never explicitly denied an alleged Soviet plan to invade Yugoslavia after Tito's departure from the scene, a plan detailed recently on Austrian TV by emigre Czechoslovak General Sejna. Almost simultaneously with Sundic's criticism, the Soviet and Czechoslovak press belatedly publicized Belgrade's anti-Italian attacks and its standard line that the invasion plan aired by Sejna was part and parcel of the same "Western pressure campaign" on Yugoslavia exemplified by the current Belgrade-Rome border dispute.

The Yugoslavs had brought the dispute with Italy out into the open on 20 March with a government statement denouncing the Italian Government's 11 March note to Belgrade protesting Yugoslavia's posting of border signs in Zone B, south of Trieste, which has been under Yugoslav administration under the terms of international agreements in 1947 and 1954.

Sundic, aside from reiterating current Belgrade grievances against the Italians in his commentary broadcast by Zagreb on the 29th, uniquely added the complaint that "even certain socialist countries have not properly supported Yugoslavia's stand regarding the Italian Government's note." While naming only Bulgaria--a frequent target of Belgrade criticism on the Macedonian issue--Sundic specified that he had in mind "not just Bulgaria" in asking rhetorically which side the socialist countries were on in the current dispute. Zeroing in more directly on the USSR, Sundic went on to note that "those to whom Sejna's discoveries about the Poljarka plan [for invasion of Austria and Yugoslavia] primarily refer have denied . . . only one of its parts, the part dealing with Austria."

In Moscow's belated publicity for the Belgrade-Rome border quarrel, PRAVDA on 28 March reported a BORBA commentary as scoring "the Italian Government's flagrant attacks" as well as "bourgeois" speculation about "the 'threat' which Yugoslavia allegedly faces

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from the East" and about "the age of our president or the fact that he is on vacation." Radio Moscow reported the PRAVDA item to Yugoslavia in a Slovene broadcast the same day. Czechoslovakia's Bratislava PRAVDA on 29 March echoed standard Yugoslav comment to the effect that an orchestrated Western "anti-Yugoslav campaign" was evident in the beginning of joint Italian-U.S. military maneuvers on that day, the 11 March Italian Government note, and the publicizing in Italian papers of allegations about Soviet plans to invade Yugoslavia that had first appeared in the Austrian TV interview with Czechoslovak defector General Sejna.

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INDOCHINA

DRV ASSAILS KISSINGER LETTER, NIXON ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

Secretary Kissinger's 25 March letter to Senator Kennedy explaining U.S. commitments in Vietnam was promptly denounced in Vietnamese communist broadcasts on 1 April, the day after its release, and drew a bitter response from Hanoi's leadership and the press on the 2d. Hanoi comment has focused on Kissinger's contention that the Paris agreement and lengthy U.S. involvement in Vietnam have committed the United States to military and economic support of the Saigon government. North Vietnamese Politburo member and Acting Premier Le Thanh Nghi, speaking at a 2 April reception for visiting Laotians, claimed that the Secretary was justifying the intensification of military aid to Saigon and the continued presence of U.S. military advisers, and charged that this position was "in flagrant contravention of the spirit and letter of the Paris agreement."

The most authoritative press comment came in a 2 April NHAN DAN article signed by Tran Kien, an author who has previously written on U.S. policies in the party paper and who was identified in 1970 as a member of its editorial board. Tran Kien charged that Kissinger's "allegations" were "extremely serious" because he was the "key negotiator and initialer" of the Paris agreement and is now Secretary of State. An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d used sharper language in explaining the particular significance of the Secretary's statements, referring to him as "Nixon's brain and mouthpiece."

Comment has quoted Sen. Kennedy's expression of concern over the policy set forth in the letter, and Tran Kien observed: "Certainly, the American people will not let the Nixon Administration drag them and their country into new dangers."

ANNIVERSARY OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL The first anniversary on 29 March of the final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam prompted editorials in the Hanoi press acclaiming the "victory" a year ago and assailing continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A broader appraisal of U.S. policies was offered in an anniversary article, published in the March issue of the North Vietnamese party's

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theoretical journal HOC TAP, which reiterated Hanoi's long-standing apprehension that U.S. policies of detente with Moscow and Peking would undermine DRV interests. The HOC TAP article was attributed to "Huong Nam," a probable pseudonym that has been used since 1969 for almost a dozen HOC TAP articles dealing with diplomacy and U.S. policy.

Huong Nam raised the issue of U.S. relations with the DRV's major allies in the context of an attack on the Nixon Doctrine, which he said uses negotiations, "especially with the USSR and China," in order to take "full advantage of the contradictions between these two countries and divide and weaken the anti-imperialist forces in the world." The article accused Washington of trying through negotiations to "limit and prevent international support and assistance to Vietnam," and noted that "it is likely that at the end of 1971" the United States "entertained many illusions" and that, "following the U.S. 'global diplomatic' activities," the Administration thought "the resistance forces were 'exhausted' and their supplies from outside were depleted."

Huong Nam has discussed U.S. overtures to the Soviets and Chinese before, most notably in an April 1972 HOC TAP article that underlined Hanoi's opposition to detente policies only a month before President Nixon's visit to Moscow.

U.S. RECONNAISSANCE Hanoi continues to protest U.S. air reconnaissance flights over the DRV in standard statements issued by the foreign ministry spokesman. The latest such statement, issued on 28 March, employed the usual terms to denounce two SR-71 flights that day "over many areas, including Hanoi and Haiphong," and to demand an end to such reconnaissance. Hanoi first alluded to the use of SR-71's in a spokesman's protest on 8 November 1973. The current statement is the eighth such protest; the last one was on 15 February.

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HANOI GIVES HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME TO CAMBODIAN FRONT LEADER

Hanoi gave a high-level welcome to a delegation from the Cambodian interior led by commander of the insurgent forces Khieu Samphan, deputy premier and defense minister in Sihanouk's government. During the delegation's stay in Hanoi from 28 March to 1 April it was hosted by Politburo member Truong Chinh, acting in his positions in the government and the Vietnam Fatherland Front. The delegation was received by Le Duan, who turned out--along with all other active members of the Politburo currently in Hanoi--for the receptions given by each side. Ieng Sary, deputy head of the delegation and a special adviser to the deputy premier's office, had similarly been warmly treated, though not at such a high level, in November 1971 when he led the last such delegation from the Cambodian interior paying an official visit to Hanoi.*

Khieu Samphan's Hanoi visit, the first leg of a tour that will include China and North Korea, represents a new step in his steady rise to prominence in the past four years.** Sihanouk took note of Samphan's new role in external affairs in a message to him, dated 27 March and publicized on 1 April, which expressed "enthusiasm" for his "first entry onto the international stage." In speeches during and after his visit to the Cambodian liberated zone a year ago, Sihanouk had acknowledged the leading role in Cambodia of Samphan and other ministers in the interior, while claiming for himself a "mission abroad."

Samphan, speaking at a 29 March Hanoi reception in his honor, maintained that the Cambodian people are united in the face of efforts to divide them, while warning that Washington and Phnom Penh "are carrying out their divisive scheme through propaganda and distortion in order to sow suspicion" within the insurgent Front. He went on to condemn the "plot" of a "false cease-fire and peace negotiations" aimed at giving Phnom Penh a respite to prepare for an offensive. Samphan

* Ieng Sary's 1971 visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 November 1971, pages 8-10.

** For background on Khieu Samphan, see the TRENDS of 14 November 1973, page 19.

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reaffirmed the demands in Sihanouk's five-point declaration of March 1970 and asserted that "in the present situation, there is only one way to solve the Cambodian issue"--by the United States ending its "aggression" in Cambodia and assistance to the Lon Nol government and allowing the Cambodians to "settle their internal affairs by themselves." Samphan did not echo Sihanouk's view, set forth most recently during his visit to Laos last month, that there could be negotiations between his government and the United States.

In line with recent Front propaganda, Samphan's speeches in Hanoi generally were cautious about the military situation in Cambodia. Thus, for example, at a public meeting in Hanoi to welcome the delegation, both Samphan and the Vietnamese speaker, Le Thanh Nghi, in effect explained the current military stalemate by claiming that the Lon Nol government continues to survive because of U.S. aid. Samphan was more optimistic in a 30 March interview with a Hanoi radio-TV reporter, when he claimed that "we are advancing to wrest total victory in the near future." But he did not go on to suggest, as he had in statements last fall, that the Phnom Penh government might be overthrown during the current dry season offensive.

Samphan's 29 March reception speech paid tribute to Vietnam's "vigorous" assistance to the Cambodian insurgents and asserted: "Our successes are inseparable from the assistance and support of the world peoples--especially of the Vietnamese, Lao, Chinese, Korean, Albanian, Cuban, and Algerian peoples. . . ." Speaking on the same occasion, Truong Chinh reaffirmed the DRV's "unchanging policy" of support for the Cambodians and added: "No intrigue, however vicious, no threat, however impudent, will ever deter the Vietnamese people in their internationalist obligation to the Cambodian people's struggle. . . ." Samphan underlined the importance of this Vietnamese pledge in his speech at a 31 March farewell reception, recalling the pledge and expressing the "deepest thanks" to Truong Chinh for making it.

The joint statement at the conclusion of Samphan's visit reported that the two sides had exchanged views on the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia and on the "friendly relations" between the two peoples. According to the communique, they "reached complete unity of views on all questions" discussed. The Vietnamese side at the

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formal talks included two Politburo members--Truong Chinh and Le Thanh Nghi--and the Cambodians had separate meetings with Politburo member and VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung.

CUBAN-DRV COMMUNIQUE PROCLAIMS SOLIDARITY, UNITY OF VIEWS

A North Vietnamese party-government delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong and including Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh has concluded a 22-28 March visit to Cuba and on 2 April--after a short interruption--began a visit to Algeria. The delegation's announced mission is to fulfill Ho Chi Minh's behest to thank countries that provided aid during the Vietnam war; its itinerary is reported to include Yugoslavia and Sweden as well.

The DRV delegation was given a warm welcome on its arrival in Havana, where it was met by Cuban Premier Castro, President Dorticos, and other Cuban officials. Speeches during the visit affirmed the two nations' "militant solidarity" and "mutual support," and Castro and Dong, at a mass rally on the 26th, recounted the history of Cuban and Vietnamese "anti-imperialist struggles" and lauded the achievements of the two nations.

The joint communique at the conclusion of Dong's visit indicated a "complete unity of views" was reached on all questions raised. Both sides condemned alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the Paris agreement and registered support for the PRG's latest six-point proposal; and both condemned U.S. intervention in Latin America and the Chilean "fascist" regime, and endorsed Cuba's views on the situations in Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Argentina. In line with the joint statement on Castro's visit to Hanoi last September, both sides again echoed Hanoi's standard pledge to "strive for the restoration and consolidation" of the unity of the international communist movement.*

Following the delegation's departure from Havana on the 28th, Nguyen Duy Trinh--but not Pham Van Dong--was reported by Hanoi and Budapest to have gone on to Hungary for an "official" visit. Available news reports gave no indication of Pham Van Dong's whereabouts until 2 April, when VNA said

* Castro's September visit to Vietnam is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 September 1973, pages 8-10.

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that the premier had met with Hungarian party leader Kadar on the previous day during a stopover en route to Algeria. A 3 April Hanoi report on Dong's departure from Budapest indicated he had been there for a "four-day stopover."

TASS STATEMENT BACKS PRG'S 22 MARCH SIX-POINT PLAN

Moscow on 31 March issued a "TASS statement" supporting the 22 March PRG Government statement with its six-point proposal for a South Vietnamese political settlement. This is the first TASS statement on Vietnam since the January 1973 peace agreement, the last previous one having been issued by Moscow on 19 December 1972 in condemnation of the large-scale U.S. bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. PRG and DRV government statements in the past year charging U.S.-Saigon violations of the peace accord have not drawn such statements from the Soviets. Moscow apparently felt compelled to endorse the PRG six-point proposal since it was issued as a government statement. Virtually identical PRG proposals on 25 April and 25 June were played in low key by the Vietnamese--in reports on the Paris PRG-GVN bilateral negotiations--and prompted only routine, low-level Soviet attention.

Typically reflecting Soviet circumspection on the U.S. role in Vietnam, the TASS statement vaguely called upon Saigon and the "external forces patronizing" it to manifest "realism" and a "positive" approach to the PRG proposals. The statement noted that the PRG initiative was met with "great satisfaction by authoritative Soviet circles."

Consistent with this low-key response, the PRG's April and June proposals were not mentioned in joint communiques on the Moscow visits by a DRV delegation led by Le Duan in July 1973 and a PRG delegation led by Nguyen Huu Tho in December 1973. However, during Pham Van Dong's recent stopover in Moscow on the way to Cuba, Kosygin may have been anticipating the current official endorsement when in his 20 March talks with Dong he reportedly voiced support for the PRG's efforts toward a "just settlement of the internal political problems" in South Vietnam.

Moscow continues to avoid official response to high-level DRV and PRG protests over alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the Paris agreement. Thus, on 31 March, the same day the

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TASS statement was released, TASS carried a press "announcement" [soobshcheniye] describing briefly for the first time an 18 March DRV note to the participants in the 1973 Paris international conference on Vietnam complaining about U.S. military aid to Saigon. The announcement charged that the main cause of the "tense situation" in South Vietnam was the "gross provocative activities" by Saigon authorities, "leaning on the support of U.S. imperialist circles."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

CHALLENGE TO PARTY DOMINATION OF SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCES

An editorial in the January 1974 issue of the journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY has issued the most outspoken critique of the system of political controls in the social sciences to appear in a Soviet publication in the postwar period. In a strongly worded defense of free inquiry in the social sciences, the editorial castigated persons who, under the guise of "ultra party loyalty" (ultrapartiynost), mask their "lack of talent and professional ability" and conduct doctrinaire "cavalry raids" against innovative social scientists. The unmistakable though unstated target of the editorial is the reactionary party campaign against ideological deviations waged by the head of the CPSU Central Committee section for science and higher educational institutions, Sergey Trapeznikov, an old Brezhnev associate from Moldavia.

The campaign under Trapeznikov's direction has been in progress for many years and was until recently aimed primarily at clearing up the intellectual debris of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization with the network of prestigious research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences. The focus of the campaign shifted last May when Trapeznikov, at a Moscow conference on philosophy, sociology and law convened by the Central Committee, launched an attack on the dangers of ideological penetration from abroad in an era of emerging detente. The campaign picked up momentum in midsummer when Trapeznikov, in an article in the July issue of KOMMUNIST No. 11, assailed continuing deviations in the field of history. In late November, at a three-day Central Committee conference on economics attended by all the leading Soviet figures in this field, he again warned against the danger posed by alien influences, both in mathematical economics and political economy.

Given the broad scope of the campaign for orthodoxy and the unique position of philosophy as the keystone of the Soviet doctrinal edifice of the social sciences, the counterattack by the philosophy journal is an event of transcendent importance. An open act of defiance against the dictates of the party apparatus would in any case mark a significant departure from the traditional pattern of reaction to ideological encroachment in the social sciences--muted or token resistance by some, "feats of silence" by others and docile acquiescence by the vast majority. However, the occurrence of this act in the main publication of a field of study once known

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for its political docility and intellectual sterility serves to dramatize the intensity of the contest now erupting over the liberation of the social sciences in the Soviet Union--the last field of study bearing the full weight of Stalin's dogmatic authority. Indeed, because of the historically inextricable ties between Soviet philosophy and official ideology, the struggle in philosophy may well be regarded as a microcosm of processes in other fields of study, as well as in the main political arena itself.*

EDITORIAL IN JANUARY
QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

Although the QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial, entitled "From Positions of Party Loyalty" (partiynost), was ostensibly addressed to the editors' plans for the journal in 1974, it clearly represents a belated reply to criticisms by Trapeznikov and others at the May 1973 conference in Moscow. The editorial merely noted, without mentioning Trapeznikov by name, that the journal had come under attack at the May conference. To judge from Trapeznikov's article in the August issue of the journal--apparently a rewrite of his unpublished conference speech--he had sharply complained of deviations from party loyalty in philosophy, sociology and law, charging that persons "calling themselves innovators" were "vulgarizing" Marxism-Leninism. Further, citing the growing dangers of ideological contamination from abroad under detente, he had called for a reaffirmation of orthodoxy and a militant party approach in the social sciences and had insisted on more active participation by philosophers in the ideological struggle.

In reply, the editorial offered a radically different interpretation of party loyalty in many ways reminiscent of the programmatic PRAVDA articles by Aleksey Rumyantsev in 1965--prior to his removal as chief editor of that paper in September 1965. It declared that "party loyalty in the Marxist-Leninist understanding" presupposes objectivity and "the need to seek out and the ability to find the truth, no matter how bitter and mercilessly critical it is." As justification, the editorial pointed to the directives of the August 1967 Central Committee decree on the social sciences, which had stressed the need for "a profound and objective analysis of the real processes of social life" and had urged

* The broad implications of trends in the social sciences in the post-Khrushchev period will be examined in a series of reports now in preparation.

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scholars to probe more deeply into "actual questions of the development of society and contemporary scientific knowledge." The editorial also cited passages from Brezhnev's August 1973 Alma-Ata speech echoing the Soviet leader's unbounded confidence in the ability of the Soviet system to meet the test of detente.

While conceding that the journal had committed occasional errors and that some philosophers had uncritically accepted foreign ideas, the editorial castigated persons who are "incompetent and uncreative but who try to 'compensate' for this shortcoming by increased activity in non-philosophical spheres," who cloak themselves in "ultra party loyalty" in order to hide their "lack of talent and professional ability," and who criticize everything but are uncreative themselves. It complained that "fake" party loyalty of this kind especially impedes discussion of new problems and declared that the principle of party loyalty does not authorize the kind of "cavalry raids" currently being launched against Soviet philosophers. Citing Lenin's statement that "he who does nothing makes no mistakes" and Brezhnev's criticism of unproductive cadres, the editorial defined the main function of the journal to be the raising of new issues and the stimulation of debate.

BACKGROUND ON
JOURNAL EDITOR

This is not the first time that the chief editor of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Ivan Frolov, has taken a bold, unorthodox position. Frolov became editor in 1968 after gaining prominence with his attacks on Trofim Lysenko's obscurantist dictatorship in genetics. A 17 May 1969 RURAL LIFE article assailed Frolov's book "Genetics and Dialectics" for having taken a non-ideological approach and for having attacked the thesis that "philosophy, natural science and mathematics are just as concerned with party loyalty as the economic and historical sciences."*

Frolov became chief editor at the relatively young age of 39 and clearly is more receptive to new ideas than the generation of philosophers who rose under Stalin. In 1968 he and 46-year-old Pavel Kopnin succeeded the old Stalinists Mark Mitin and Fedor Konstantinov, both 67, as editor of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY and director of the Institute of Philosophy, respectively. By contrast, Mitin has spent his entire career seeking out heretics and combating alien ideological influences, most recently in a 22 November RED STAR article on ideological struggle under detente.

* For background, see the FBIS SURVEY for 5 June 1969, pages 6-7.

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Konstantinov, a onetime Agitprop chief, has likewise performed as an agent of ideological intimidation in philosophy. Since 1967 he has held the post of academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' philosophy and law division, acting as supervisor of the fields of philosophy, sociology and law.

COUNTERVAILING TRENDS The latest flareup in this field may be traced to the 1971 removal of the liberal overseer of the social sciences, Aleksey Rumyantsev, from the post of vice president of the Academy of Sciences. Although his successor, Petr Fedoseyev, had acquired a reputation for revisionism under Stalin and Khrushchev, he has become at the age of 66 a more conservative philosopher. He keynoted the first congress of the newly formed USSR Philosophy Society in December 1971 with a call for intensifying ideological influences in the social sciences. The society itself, with Konstantinov as president and reactionaries like Mitin and Mikhail Rutkevich among the vice presidents, was part of a general effort to tighten controls in the field of philosophy. More recently, Fedoseyev has joined Trapeznikov and other reactionaries in attacking deviations in various institutes under the Academy of Sciences.

The effort to impose orthodoxy has met stiff resistance, however, as evidenced by the failure to fill the post of director of the Institute of Philosophy for almost two years following the untimely death of young philosopher Kopnin in June 1971. In the spring of 1973 the post was finally filled by the 69-year-old director of the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology, Bonifatii Kedrov.

Kedrov had distinguished himself in the early postwar period as the first chief editor of the then newly created journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY and as an eloquent exponent of the universality of science and the absurdity of national boundaries in this field. His views on this matter appeared in a 1946 work on philosophy at a time when Soviet propagandists were advancing preposterous claims about Soviet priority in the realm of inventions. For these views and for a series of controversial articles on quantum physics, Mendelian genetics, and Russian intellectual history published in his journal in 1948, Kedrov was condemned as a "homeless cosmopolitan" in early 1949, removed from his post, forced to recant his "mistakes" and driven into professional exile--only to reappear after Stalin's death as a major figure in Soviet philosophy and a force for intellectual enlightenment. Indeed, the return of this battle-scarred victim of Stalinism to the philosophical front at the very moment when Trapeznikov was initiating his reactionary assault may have set the stage for the unprecedented eruption in the pages of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 - 31 MARCH 1974

<u>Moscow (3128 items)</u>				<u>Peking (1161 items)</u>			
Kissinger in Moscow	(--)	9%		Tanzanian President	(2%)	16%*	
China	(6%)	9%		Nyerere in PRC			
[USSR Foreign Ministry	(--)	2%]		Criticism of Lin Piao and	(8%)	7%	
Note on Helicopter				Confucius			
Incident				Korea	(--)	6%	
24th CPSU Congress 3d	(--)	6%		Cambodia	(13%)	6%	
Anniversary				[Front Leaders in	(--)	2%]	
Chile	(5%)	4%		DRV			
Grechko in Iraq	(--)	3%		Vietnam	(1%)	5%	
Vietnam	(5%)	3%		[PEOPLE'S DAILY	(--)	3%]	
[TASS Statement on	(--)	1%]		Commentator on PRG			
PRG 22 March 6-Point				22 March 6-Point			
Proposal				Proposal			
Upcoming Supreme Soviet	(1%)	3%		USSR	(3%)	3%	
Elections				[PRC Foreign Ministry	(--)	2%]	
				Note Protesting Heli-			
				copter Intrusion			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports of Nyerere's meeting with Mao Tse-tung.